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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The tendency of the law must always be
to narrow the field of uncertainty.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional "discovery rule" provides that the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run until an injured party knows, or through
the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of an injury and the
party responsible for the injury. This is generally true even if the
injured party's failure to discover the injury or the identity of the
wrongdoer is due to the general circumstances surrounding the activity
and does not require that the wrongdoer intentionally play some role in
"covering up" the injury. For example, the discovery rule would delay
the running of the statute of limitations where a surgeon left a sponge
in a patient's abdomen during surgery, even if the surgeon did not
realize the sponge had been left there nor take steps to hide that fact
from the patient. Although the discovery rule has been long recognized
in West Virginia, language in a syllabus point and in the body of a
recent decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals sug-
gests that the discovery rule will not be triggered unless the wrongdoer
intentionally plays some active role in preventing the discovery of the
injury.2 This Comment will review the history of the discovery rule in
West Virginia and argue that such a meaning was not intended by the
state supreme court and that the traditional discovery rule is alive and
well in West Virginia.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 127 (1881), cited in Cart v.
Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644, 648 (W. Va. 1992).
2. Cart v. Marcum, 423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992).
[Vol. 96:11971198
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCOVERY RULE AS AN EXCEPTION
TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. An Overview of the Statute of Limitations and Discovery Rule
As a general rule, statutes of limitations require a plaintiff to bring
a lawsuit within a specific time period after a cause of action "ac-
crues."3 The United States Supreme Court has explained the underly-
ing rationale behind statutes of limitations as follows:
These enactments are statutes of repose; and although affording plaintiffs
what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims, they
protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which
the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disap-
pearance of documents, or otherwise.'
A cause of action accrues when all of the facts needed to give a
party a right to recover from another have occurred. In an uncompli-
cated case, such as a personal injury tort case where the injury is
immediately recognized, the cause of action accrues and the statute of
limitations typically begins to run on the date of the injury.' In addi-
tion, mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action or of the
identity of the wrongdoer generally does not prevent the running of a
statute of limitations.
3. See Steeley v. Funkhouser, 169 S.E.2d 701 (W. Va. 1969); Sansom v. Sansom,
137 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1964); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 108.
4. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979); see also Romano v. Westinghouse
Electric Co., 336 A.2d 555, 560 (R.I. 1975) (explaining that statutes of limitations supply a
mechanism to keep plaintiffs from "sleeping on their rights."); Pierce v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (Md. 1983) (explaining that statutes of limitations gener-
ally promote judicial economy).
5. See, e.g., Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College, 351 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1986).
The statute of limitations for personal injury and property damage in West Virginia is set
forth in W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1994).
1994] 1199
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Because a statute of limitations can have potentially harsh results,6
the rule that the statutory period begins to run at the time of the inju-
ry is not absolute. Instead, numerous courts have adopted what has
come to be known as the "discovery rule." Under the discovery rule, a
cause of action will not accrue in certain circumstances until a claim-
ant knows or should reasonably know of the existence of his claim.'
A textbook example of the discovery rule would be a case of hidden
injury, e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge inside a patient during the
course of an operation and the sponge is discovered by x-ray several
years after the fact.' In this example, if a discovery rule were applied,
the statute of limitations would begin to run when the patient learned
of the sponge. Thus, as one court has explained, the discovery rule
"was formulated to avoid the harsh results produced by commencing
the running of the statute of limitations before a claimant was aware
of any basis for an action."9
B. The Discovery Rule in West Virginia
In 1920, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted the
beginnings of a discovery rule for West Virginia. In Petrelli v. West
Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co.," the court held that the statute of limi-
tations in an underground trespass case would run "only from the time
of actual discovery of the trespass, or the time when discovery was
reasonably possible."'" The court adopted the rule for subterranean
6. See Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 (Pa.
1983) (explaining that a statute of limitations is a "law arbitrarily making legal remedies
contingent on mere lapse of time.").
7. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 87(a) (1987).
8. See, e.g., Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959) (applying the discovery rule
and holding that when a surgeon left a sponge inside a patient during the course of an
operation, the statute of limitations began to run nine years later when the sponge was
discovered by an x-ray).
9. Hammer v. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
428 N.W.2d 552 (Wis. 1988).
10. Petrelli v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 104 S.E. 103 (W. Va. 1920). In
Petrelli, a coal company mined coal from underneath the plaintiff's property, and the plain-
tiff did not discover the trespass until several years later. The defendant asserted the two
year statute of limitations as a defense.
11. Id. at 106.
1200 [Vol. 96:1197
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trespass because it is generally within the power of the trespasser, by
failing to disclose the trespass, to prevent the injured party from as-
serting his right to redress within the statutory period. The court rea-
soned that such action by the trespasser is fraudulent, 2 and the stat-
ute of limitations should be tolled until the injured party discovers, or
reasonably could have discovered, the trespass. 3
Over time, the supreme court expanded the discovery rule to cover
other types of tort cases. The first expansion came in the area of med-
ical malpractice and concerned injuries that, like the underground tres-
pass in Petrelli, were difficult for the injured party to detect.
1. Medical Malpractice
As previously explained, the classic example of an injury that is
difficult to detect is a surgeon who leaves a foreign object in a patient
during an operation. 4 However, until 1965, the rule in West Virginia
was that absent actual knowledge, fraud, or concealment on the part of
the surgeon, the cause of action accrued at the time the foreign object
was left behind-not when the patient discovered the injury. 5
Recognizing the harshness of a rule that barred a plaintiffs cause
of action before a plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to discover an
injury, the court overruled its earlier decision and adopted a foreign
object discovery rule in medical malpractice actions in Morgan v.
Grace Hospital, Inc. 6 In Morgan, a sponge was left in a patient's
abdomen and was not discovered until ten years later. The court held
that a foreign object negligently left in a patient's body by a surgeon
will toll the statute of limitations if the patient is ignorant of the fact,
12. The defendant's fraudulent concealment of the cause of action or of the identity
of the wrongdoer also tolls the limitations period by statute in West Virginia. See W. VA.
CODE § 55-2-17 (1994); see also Sattler v. Bailey, 400 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1990).
13. Petrelli, 104 S.E. at 106.
14. Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc., 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
15. See Gray v. Wright, 96 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1957) (holding that a patient who
did not discover the injury and bring suit during the limitations period was barred by the
statute of limitations).
16. 144 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1965).
19941 1201
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and consequently, of his right of action for malpractice. 7 In this cir-
cumstance, the cause of action does not accrue until the patient learns
of or, in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have
learned of, the foreign object in his body.'8
Two years later, in Hundley v. Martinez,9 a case where the de-
fendant physician was accused of fraudulently concealing an injury
from a patient, the court noted that while Morgan did restrict the
discovery rule to cases involving "foreign objects in the body," it did
not abrogate the discovery rule as it applied to fraudulent concealment
in medical malpractice cases.20 Therefore, as of 1967, suit could be
brought in medical malpractice cases under the discovery rule excep-
tion to the statute of limitations if either: (1) a foreign object was left
behind, or (2) the cause of action was fraudulently concealed from the
defendant. Whether the discovery rule applied to other factual situa-
tions under medical malpractice was not clear from the opinion in
Hundley.
The first indicators that the discovery rule in medical malpractice
cases was not limited to foreign objects or fraudulent concealment
came in Bishop v. Byrne, a case from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia.2' In Bishop, a negligent
sterilization case, the district court utilized a broader form of the Mor-
gan rule and held that the period of limitations does not begin to run
against the plaintiffs cause of action until he learns of, or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of, the
defendant's negligent act or omission. 2
Finally, in 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
specifically articulated the traditional discovery rule for medical mal-
practice in the case of Hill v. Clarke.23 Hill, like Morgan, involved a
foreign object left behind during surgery, and the court applied the
17. Id. at 162.
18. Id. at 162.
19. 158 S.E.2d 159 (W. Va. 1967).
20. Id. at 166.
21. 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967).
22. Id. at 466.
23. 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978).
[Vol. 96:11971202
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foreign object discovery rule from Morgan. However, in addition to
the foreign object discovery rule, the court also held that a plaintiffs
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence has reason to know, of the alleged malpractice.24
In addition, the court in Hill took the opportunity to clarify the appli-
cation of the discovery rule by explaining that the rule "applies to all
factual questions under the discovery rule and not solely to cases
where fraudulent concealment is at issue. 25
In Harrison v. Seltzer,26 the court again accepted for review a
medical malpractice case. In Harrison, the court noted that "in mal-
practice, our discovery rule does not initially rest on a showing of
fraudulent concealment, but rather on whether the injured plaintiff was
aware of the malpractice or, by the exercise of reasonable care, should
have discovered it."'27 Thus, the court in Harrison recognized that the
focus under the discovery rule properly belonged on the awareness of
the plaintiff rather than on the actions of the defendant.
Finally, Jones v. Trustees of Bethany College28 involved a plain-
tiff who settled and released with his insurance company for injuries
sustained in an auto accident, only to discover latent back injuries after
the limitations period had run. In foreclosing application of the discov-
ery rule in this instance, the court concluded that the applicable two-
year limitations period,29 combined with the normal time-consuming
pretrial procedures, should enable a plaintiff to learn of any latent
injuries that result from an initial traumatic event. Therefore, the court
held that "where a plaintiff sustains a noticeable personal injury from
a traumatic event, the statute of limitations begins to run and is not
tolled because there may also be a latent injury arising from the same
traumatic event."3
24. Id. at 574. The court also reiterated the rule first set out in Hundley that the
question of when the plaintiff knew or should have known through the exercise of reason-
able diligence of the malpractice is a question for the jury. Id. at 573.
25. Id.
26. 268 S.E.2d 312, 314 (W. Va. 1980).
27. Id. at 314.
28. 351 S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1986).
29. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1994).
30. Jones, 351 S.E.2d at 187 (emphasis added).
1994] 1203
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The West Virginia Legislature codified the medical malpractice
discovery rule under the Medical Professional Liability Act of 1986."'
As a result, the discovery rule still applies to medical malpractice, but
is subject to an outside limit of ten years from the date of the inju-
ry 32
2. Legal Malpractice
Like medical malpractice, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has also applied the discovery rule to legal malpractice.33 In
Family Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Ciccarello,3 a client hired an attor-
ney to do a title search prior to purchasing property, and the attorney
failed to report a special use limitation on the title. More than a year
after the work was completed,35 the client discovered the defect in the
31. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (1986) states:
(a) A cause of action for injury to a person alleging medical professional
liability against a health care provider arises as of the date of injury, except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section, and must be commenced within two
years of the date of such injury, or within two years of the date when such per-
son discovers, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered
such injury, whichever last occurs: Provided, That in no event shall any such
action be commenced more than ten years after the date of injury.
(b) A cause of action for injury to a minor, brought by or on behalf of a
minor who was under the age of ten years at the time of such injury, shall be
commenced within two years of the date of such injury, or prior to the minor's
twelfth birthday, whichever provides the longer period.
(c) The periods of limitation set forth in this section shall be tolled for any
period during which the health care provider or its representative has committed
fraud or collusion by concealing or misrepresenting material facts about the injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
Subsection (b), which shortens the extended time period given to infants (to age eigh-
teen) by a general statute of limitations tolling statute, W. VA. CODE § 55-2-15 (1994), is
likely unconstitutional under the West Virginia Supreme Court's recent holding in Whitlow
v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha County, 438 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1993).
32. W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-4 (1986).
33. See generally Vincent Paul Cardi, Determining the Appropriate Time Limitations
on Attorney Malpractice Lawsuits in West Virginia: A Brief Overview, 95 W. VA. L. REV.
913 (1993).
34. 207 S.E.2d 157, 162 (W. Va. 1974), overruled on other grounds by Hall v.
Nichols. 400 S.E.2d 901 (W. Va. 1990).
35. The applicable statute of limitations period under W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12(c)
(1994) is one year.
1204 [Vol. 96:1197
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title. The court applied the discovery rule and held that the cause of
action accrued on the date the defect in the title was discovered and
not on the date the title work was completed.36 To justify the expan-
sion of the discovery rule to legal malpractice, the court commented
that:
We adhere to the reasoning employed in Morgan and apply it to the in-
stant case. Although, as asserted by the defendant, the Morgan decision
applying the "discovery rule" was restricted to cases involving foreign ob-
jects negligently left in a patient's body, we discern no valid reason why
the principle expressed therein should not be extended when such extension
is designed to promote justice and right. Morgan extended the rule to
escape one which was "unrealistic and cruelly harsh." For the same reason
we extend the Morgan rule to cover the instant case?7
Interestingly, the court in Ciccarello explained that the discovery
rule was being adopted "not on the theory of fraud but on the basis of
the damages having occurred when the defect in title was discovered
or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discov-
ered."38 It seems that the court expressly stated that the discovery rule
was not being adopted on a fraud theory in order to make clear that
the decisions in Morgan and Hundley, both of which were decided
before Ciccarello, were not intended to limit the discovery rule to only
those cases involving a fraudulent concealment of the alleged malprac-
tice.39
3. Product Liability
The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia first applied the West Virginia discovery rule in a products
liability case in Pauley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.4" In Pauley,
an asbestosis case, the district court predicted that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals would not follow an earlier decision handed
36. See Harrison, 268 S.E.2d at 314.
37. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d at 162.
38. Id. at 163.
39. See Harrison, 268 S.E.2d at 314.
40. 528 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
1994] 1205
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down in the case of Scott v. Rinehart & Dennis Co., ' which held
that the discovery rule did not apply in a silicosis case.42 The district
court reasoned that Scott would not be followed because the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had since adopted the discovery
rule in the areas of underground trespass, medical malpractice, and
legal malpractice and would likely continue this trend.
In adopting the discovery rule, the court noted that the purpose of
the statute of limitations is "to encourage promptness in instituting
claims and to avoid inconvenience which may result from a delay in
asserting claims when it is practicable for plaintiff to assert them."43
The court then concluded that applying the discovery rule in product
liability cases did not defeat the purpose of the statute of limitations
because "in cases where the injury to the plaintiff is susceptible to
concealment, through no fraudulent act on the part of the defendant, it
[is] unreasonable, unfair and unjust to require the plaintiff to file his
cause of action before he can reasonably discover his injury."" Final-
ly, the court held that the "plaintiffs cause of action accrued when he
knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known,
of the existence of his injury and its cause."45
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals directly addressed
the issue of the discovery rule for product liability in a 1987 case,
Hickman v. Grover.46 The court noted that cases dealing with chemi-
cals, drugs, asbestosis, and products like the Dalkon Shield, present
common situations where injuries arise only after long exposure to a
product or where injuries arise a long time after exposure to a prod-
41. 180 S.E. 276 (W. Va. 1935).
42. In Scott, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that: (1) the cause of
action accrued when the injury was inflicted; (2) that mere ignorance of a cause of action
does not suspend the operation of the statute of limitations; and (3) that the statute of limi-
tations therefore barred an action for personal injury by a tunnel worker who had contracted
silicosis from tunnel dust even though the plaintiff did not discover that he had silicosis
until more than two years after he left the job. Id. At that time, the applicable limitations
period under W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1923), was one year.
43. Id. at 764 (citing Morgan, 144 S.E.2d at 161).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 765.
46. 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987).
1206 [Vol. 96:1197
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uct 7 Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action should arise only when
the injury is pronounced enough to put the plaintiff on notice that he
has been injured and when the plaintiff can determine the cause of the
injury." In its holding, the court refined the test for when the cause
of action accrues for product liability by stating that "[t]he statute
begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reason-
able diligence should know, (1) that he has been injured, (2) the iden-
tity of the maker of the product, and (3) that the product had a causal
relation to his injury."'49
4. Faulty Construction Cases, The Discovery Rule, and
Statutes of Repose
Under the architects and builders statute, 0 "[n]o action, whether
in contract or in tort, for indemnity or otherwise . . . may be brought
more than ten years after the performance or furnishing of such servic-
es or construction . . . ."" The period of limitations begins when the
"improvement to the real property in question has been occupied or
accepted by the owner of the real property, whichever occurs first."'52
Because the architects and builders statute is a statute of repose,
once the ten year limitations period runs, all actions are barred. A stat-
ute of repose can be distinguished from a statute of limitations in that
"[u]nder a statute of repose, a cause of action is foreclosed after a
stated time period regardless of when the injury occurred,"53 whereas,
under a statute of limitations, a cause of action is foreclosed within a
specific time period of when the action accrues.4 Thus, the purpose
of a statute of repose is to set an arbitrary time period after which no
actions, whether contract or tort, may be brought.55
47. Id at 813.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (1994).
51. Shirkey v. Mackey, 399 S.E.2d 868, 870 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (1994)).
52. Id
53. Gibson v. W. Va. Dep't of Highways, 406 S.E.2d 440, 443 (W. Va. 1991).
54. For an explanation of when a cause of action accrues, see part I1I.A.
55. Gibson, 406 S.E.2d at 443.
1994] 1207
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Therefore, even though faulty construction claims can sound in
tort or in contract, the arbitrary ten year time limit set out in the ar-
chitects and builders statute will not be tolled by the discovery rule. 6
It should also be noted that the pre-existing statutes of limitation for
both contract and tort actions will continue to operate within the ten
year outside limit set out in West Virginia Code Section 55-2-6a. 7
5. Invasion of Privacy
Finally, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals continued its
expansion of the discovery rule to include the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy in Slack v. Kanawha County Housing and Redevelopment Author-
ity. 8 Slack involved the "bugging" of an employee's office by her
superior, and the issue was whether the plaintiffs lawsuit was filed
within one year of the date on which the cause of action accrued. The
court held that the discovery rule applied and that the statute did not
begin to run until the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known, that her privacy had been invaded. 9
III. C4RT V. MARCUM: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the case of Cart v. Marcum,' Cart, a landowner and the origi-
nal plaintiff, entered into an oral contract in June of 1988 with Jeffer-
son, a logger and one of the defendants. Under the terms of their
agreement, Jefferson agreed to bear the expense for cutting, removing,
selling, and replanting timber from 65 acres owned by Cart. In return,
Jefferson was to receive half the proceeds from the sale of the timber.
Although Jefferson produced a written contract reflecting their oral
agreement, the contract was never signed.
56. Shirkey, 399 S.E.2d at 870; Basham v. General Shale, 377 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va.
1988).
57. Shirkey, 399 S.E.2d at 871.
58. 423 S.E.2d 5,47 (W. Va. 1992). Again, the applicable statute of limitations is one
year under W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1994).
59. Slack, 423 S.E.2d at 553.
60. 423 S.E.2d 6,14 (W. Va. 1992).
1208 [Vol. 96:1197
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According to Cart, because Jefferson stalled for six weeks in exe-
cuting the written contract, Cart put up a fence and then told Jefferson
to sign the contract or stay off his property. Instead, Jefferson entered
Cart's property, removed the timber he had already cut, sold it to saw
mills for processing, and then disappeared with the money. Cart first
noticed that the cut timber had been removed from his property on
August 14, 1988. According to the record below, the conversion took
place no later than August 9, 1988.61
Although Cart could not find Jefferson, he did find out in the fall
of 1989 that Jefferson had sold at least some of the timber to defen-
dants Hager and Marcum. Apparently, Jefferson sold the timber to
Hager, and then Hager hired Marcum to haul and process the timber at
his sawmill. Cart filed suit against Jefferson, Hager, and Marcum on
August 10, 1990. The Circuit Court of Cabell County dismissed the
case against Marcum and Hager on summary judgment reasoning that
Cart had filed his case more than two years after the cause of action
accrued and was thus barred from bringing suit by the statute of limi-
tations.62 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals accepted the
case for review, and in an opinion authored by Justice Richard Neely,
affirmed the lower court's ruling.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Expansion of the Discovery Rule to all Torts in West Virginia
In Cart,63 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals narrowed
the field of uncertainty in the torts area by holding that the discovery
rule is "generally applicable to all torts, unless there is a clear statuto-
ry prohibition of its application."' The court gave two reasons to
61. Id at 646.
62. 'The statute of limitations in this case was two years, see W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12
(1981), and the lower court found that the statute had expired as of August 9, 1990. Id. at
646.
63. 423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992).
64. Id. at 648 (emphasis added). To explain the expansion of the discovery rule to all
torts, the court cited back to the piecemeal expansion of the discovery rule in the areas of
19941 1209
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support its decision. First, the court wanted to put an end to the tort-
by-tort adoption of the discovery rule and provide a bright line rule in
the torts arena. Second, the court felt that the interests of justice and
fundamental fairness would best be served by adopting such a rule.
Here, the court noted that West Virginia was not the first jurisdiction
to expand the discovery rule to all tort claims.65 Accordingly, after the
Cart decision, all tort claims will accrue on the date the injury is dis-
covered, or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, unless the
tort is already controlled by a legislatively created discovery rule.66
B. Does Cart Threaten the Discovery Rule Status Quo?
The court's opinion in Cart inexplicably muddies the clear evolu-
tion of the discovery rule, which continued into and through most of
the Cart decision, by suggesting that the rule might apply only where
the defendant takes some action to conceal the injury or the identity of
the wrongdoer. Three portions of the opinion create this confusion.
These include: ([) the third syllabus point in the opinion, which re-
quires that some action by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from
knowing of the wrong at the time of the injury;67 (2) a portion of the
opinion focusing on the "defendant's conduct" rather than the
plaintiffs awareness;" and (3) a portion of the opinion concerning a
requirement that -the plaintiff show that he was "prevented from know-
ing of the claim at the time of the injury."69
The court's syllabus in Cart contains three points. The first point
juxtaposes the statute of limitations and the discovery rule in familiar
fashion.70 The second point expands the discovery rule to all tort cas-
es not governed by statute.7' The first clause of the third point reit-
products liability, faulty construction, and invasion of privacy. Then, the Court noted that
each expansion of the discovery rule had caused a loss of predictability in bright line rules
and revived litigation that should be long dead. Id.
65. Id. (citing Hansen v. A.H. Robbins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. 1983)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 645 (Syl. Pt. 3).
68. Id. at 648.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 645 (Syl. Pt. 1). Generally, a cause of action accrues (i.e., the statute of
limitations begins to run) when a tort occurs; under the "discovery rule," the statute of limi-
tations is tolled until a claimant knows or by reasonable diligence should know of his claim.
71. 2. The "discovery rule" is generally applicable to all torts, unless there is a clear
1210 [Vol. 96:1197
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erates the general rule that mere ignorance of a cause of action or the
identity of a wrongdoer does not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations.72 Notwithstanding the first two-and-a-half syllabus points,
the court goes on, in the second clause of Syllabus Point 3, to cast
doubt on the application of the discovery rule by stating that the rule
"applies only when there is a strong showing by the plaintiff that some
action by the defendant prevented the plaintiff from knowing of the
wrong at the time of the injury.""
Reinforcing this notion, the court goes on to state in the body of
the opinion that "the statute of limitations will apply unless the handi-
caps to discovery are great and are largely the product of the
defendant's conduct in concealing either the tort or the wrongdoer's
identity."74 In addition, the court held that "[t]he 'discovery rule,'
then, is to be applied with great circumspection on a case-by-case basis
only where there is a strong showing by the plaintiff that he was pre-
vented from knowing of the claim at the time of the injury."75
As a result of this language, one reading of Cart is that the court
is now requiring the plaintiff to show that some type of fraudulent
concealment or other affirmative conduct by the defendant prevented
the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action or the identity of the
wrongdoer. However, it is highly unlikely that the court intended such
a requirement. First, such a requirement would "eviscerate" the discov-
ery rule that the court has been developing for the past twenty years.
Second, there is another explanation of why the unfortunate language
made it into the opinion. Third, in a subsequent case the court applies
the general discovery rule, making no mention of any requirement that
the defendant must actively conceal either his identity or the injury.76
statutory prohibition of its application.
72. Id. at 645 (Syl. Pt. 3).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 648.
75. Id.
76. Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 728 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that "[w]here a
cause of action is based on tort or on a claim of fraud, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the injured person knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence
should know, of the nature of his injury .... ") (quoting Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d
561 (W. Va. 1990)).
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C. The Discovery Rule is Alive and Well in West Virginia
One thing is clear from the Cart opinion-the discovery rule is
applicable to all torts in West Virginia except where its application is
expressly prohibited by statute." On the other hand, determining the
circumstances that will allow a plaintiff to toll the statute of limitations
under the discovery rule requires a closer reading of both the Cart
decision and the other discovery rule cases.
It is well settled that the focus under the discovery rule is on the
plaintiffs "awareness"--that is, on whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known of his cause of action or of the identity of the
wrongdoer." The court in Cart acknowledged as much.79 It seems
unlikely that the court would emphasize the focus on the plaintiffs
"awareness" in Cart and then ignore it by holding that the plaintiff can
only invoke the discovery rule in cases where some affirmative action
by the defendant prevented discovery of the claim. Moreover, the court
-has stated in past decisions that it does not intend to limit the discov-
ery rule to fraudulent concealment"0 and that the question of when a
plaintiff knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
know, of a cause of action is a "statute of limitations principle...
[that] applies to all factual questions under the 'discovery rule' and not
solely to cases where fraudulent concealment is at issue."'"
77. Id. at 649. Examples of such prohibition include the architects and builders statute
(W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a (1994)), and the Medical Malpractice Reform Statute of Repose
(W. VA. CODE § 55-7b-4 (1986)). Each of the statutes places an outside limit of ten years
from the date of the inJury, after which any action is barred. This would, of course, include
actions that were discovered only after the ten year period had run. Shirkey, 399 S.E.2d at
870. Any other result would negate the purpose of the statutes: to end the possibility of
litigation after a reasonable, albeit arbitrary, time limit. Id. at 871. Therefore, the discovery
rule is inapplicable after the statute of repose has run.
78. Harrison, 268 S.E.2d 312; Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157.
79. The court noted that the discovery rule evolved from the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment. As part of that evolution, the primary focus changed from the fraudulent activ-
ities of the defendant to the "awareness" of the plaintiff. Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 647 n.6.
80. Harrison, 268 S.E.2d at 314; Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d at 163.
81. Hill v. Clarke, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1979).
[Vol. 96:11971212
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Also noteworthy is language contained in the product liability
cases of Pauley82 and Hickman.13 As previously explained, the feder-
al district court in Pauley held that "in cases where the injury to the
plaintiff is susceptible to concealment, through no fraudulent act on the
part of the defendant, it [is] unreasonable, unfair and unjust to require
the plaintiff to file his cause of action before he can reasonably dis-
cover his injury." 4 In Hickman, the West Virginia Supreme Court
agreed with the decision in Pauley and held that the plaintiffs cause
of action should arise, and the limitations period begin running, only
when the injury is pronounced enough to put the plaintiff on notice
that he has been injured and when the plaintiff can determine the cause
of the injury.8"
Considering the wealth of precedent holding that a plaintiff can
invoke the discovery rule in situations even where the defendant did
not affirmatively act to prevent the plaintiff from discovering his claim,
it is very improbable that the supreme court meant to add such a re-
quirement to the traditional discovery rule. Consequently, a more rea-
sonable interpretation of the ambiguous language in Cart is that the
court is not revising the discovery rule. Instead, the facts of this case,
and not the application of the discovery rule generally, prompted the
court to conclude that Cart must show that some act by the defendants
prevented him from discovering his claim against them.
At this point, it may be helpful to revisit the Cart court's guide-
lines for using the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations.
Two general rules must be considered in applying the discovery rule.
First, mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action or of the
identity of the wrongdoer does not prevent the running of a statute of
limitations.86 Second, the discovery rule provides that tort claims ac-
crue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence
82. 528 F. Supp. 759, 764-65 (S.D. W. Va. 1981).
83. 358 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1987).
84. Pauley, 528 F. Supp. at 765 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 813. Justice Brotherton explained that "Itihe United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia has predicted that we, if given the opportunity, would
embrace the discovery rule in products liability personal injury actions. They were correct."
Id. (citations omitted).
86. Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 648.
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should be discovered, whichever occurs first.87 Thus, to avoid a stat-
ute of limitations defense, a plaintiff must be able to point to a factor
other than his own ignorance in order to show that he was prevented
from discovering his cause of action or the identity of the wrongdoer.
These factors include a showing that: (1) the defendant fraudulently
concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff;88 (2) through no fault
of his own, the plaintiff could not comprehend his injury; 9 or (3)
some other extreme hardship prevented the plaintiff from discovering
the cause of action.90
Ultimately, the determination of whether a plaintiff was merely
ignorant of his claim due to inattention or negligence or whether the
plaintiff was unable to discover the claim because it was latent or was
actively concealed by the defendant is a factual question. Therefore, the
court requires great circumspection on a case-by-case basis. With this
understanding of how the discovery rule works, we can now turn back
to the facts of the Cart decision to explain why the discovery rule did
not toll the running of the statute of limitations as to Hager and
Marcum.
Consider the somewhat analogous result in Jones v. Bethany Hos-
pital.9 As previously explained, the court in Jones held that the dis-
covery rule is inapplicable when there is a noticeable personal injury
from a traumatic. event.9" In Jones, the court found that the original
injury suffered by the plaintiff, combined with the time-consuming pre-
trial discovery and other procedures, gave the plaintiff ample notice
and time to explore the full extent of his injuries. Therefore, when the
plaintiff failed to discover his latent injuries until after the limitations
period had run, his cause of action was barred by the statute of limita-
tions because he had been on notice to explore the full extent of his
injuries.93
87. Id. (citing Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Wis. 1983)).
88. Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 649 n.15.
89. Examples of incomprehensible injury include foreign objects left behind during sur-
gery and exposure to toxins that manifest an injury only years later.
90. The opinion did not provide any example of what constitutes extreme hardship.
91. 351 S.E.2d 183.
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Applying the reasoning from Jones, it is possible to conclude that
Cart had notice of his injury-i.e., he knew the identity of the wrong-
doer and had ample time within the statutory period to fully explore
the extent of his injury.9" In considering all three prongs of the dis-
covery rule, the court in Cart analyzed not only the plaintiffs "aware-
ness," but also whether the other defendants, Hager and Marcum, had
done anything to prevent Cart from discovering their identity.9" Fol-
lowing their own three point test, the court first had to determine
whether there was some extreme hardship preventing Cart's discovery
of the theft of the timber or the identity of the thieves. Finding none,
the court then had to determine whether the nature and circumstances
of the theft prevented Cart from discovering the theft or the identity of
the thieves. Finding this was not so, the court finally had to determine
whether the defendants took any action to fraudulently conceal the theft
or their identities. From the record, there was no indication that Hager
or Marcum did anything but conduct themselves in the ordinary course
of their businesses. Therefore, the court concluded that Cart was aware
of both his injury and of who had injured him.
It follows then that Cart would be on notice to inquire into the
full extent of his injury. The responsibility to inquire would include the
responsibility to determine whether other parties could be held liable in
the action. This explains the confusing language of Syllabus Point
3-Cart could succeed against a statute of limitations defense asserted
by Hager and Marcum only if he could make "a strong showing . . .
that some action by the defendant[s] prevented [him] from knowing of
the wrong at the time of the injury."9 Cart could not make such a
showing. This conclusion is further bolstered by previous decisions of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals holding that a statement
contained in the court's syllabus should be read in light of the opinion
and the facts contained in the opinion.97
94. The court noted that Mr. Cart had nearly a year left of the limitations period
when he did discover Mr. Hager and Mr. Marcum's identities, but still .failed to file his
claim in time. Marcum at 649.
95. Recall that the court noted that an action against the hidden Mr. Jefferson.
96. Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 645 (Syl. Pt. 3).
97. See, e.g., Summers County Citizens League, Inc., v. Tassos, 367 S.E.2d 217, 221
(W. Va. 1988) (explaining that a syllabus point must be read in light of the facts in the
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It is interesting to note that in the part of the opinion where the
court discusses the discovery rule in general, no reference is made to a
requirement of showing "some action by the defendant" that prevented
the plaintiff from discovering his injury.98 Such a deletion leads to the
conclusion that the court does not consider action on the part of the
defendant to be a requirement for the tolling of the statute of limita-
tions under the discovery rule. This is the only construction that allows
the discovery rule to operate properly when fraud is not involved.
Note, for instance, that in the area of incomprehensible injury, the
court has not held since Gray99 that a surgeon must have somehow
concealed a cause of action from the plaintiff before a plaintiff can
avail himself of the discovery rule. In fact, this requirement was spe-
cifically eliminated in later cases.' 0 Moreover, Justice Neely gives an
example of an incomprehensible injury in the Cart decision and no-
where does he mention a requirement that the defendant must have
prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury or who caused
it. 10
As to the third prong of the discovery rule, other extreme hard-
ship, the court makes only the vague comment that "special rules apply
in a case involving particular hardship or other circumstance."'0 2 The
meaning of this clause is beyond the scope of this comment. Certainly
the issue will arise in the future.
opinion); see also State v. Vollner, 259 S.E.2d 839 (W. Va. 1979); State v. Franklin, 79
S.E.2d 692, 700 (W. Va. 1954); Thomas P. Hardman, The Law-In West Virginia, 47 W.
VA. L.Q. 23 (1940-41) (discussing the function of a syllabus point).
98. Cart, 423 S.E.2d. at 645, 648.
99. Gray, 96 S.E.2d 671 (W. Va. 1957).
100. See Morgan, 144 S.E.2d 156; see also Harrison, 268 S.E.2d at 314.
101. Cart, 423 S.E.2d at 647. The example merely cited the requirement that the plain-
tiff have a good reason for not being aware of his injury. The court noted by way of ex-
ample that if a plaintiff with health insurance experienced pain from a surgical device left
behind after an operation, that plaintiff would have been on notice that something was
wrong and at least be required to inquire further or be barred after two years. On the other
hand, if a plaintiff experienced no pain, but discovered the device during a routine diagnosis
five years later, then immediately brought suit, the plaintiffs claim would be protected by
the discovery rule.
102. Id. at 648.
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Under the interpretation of Cart set out above, the most significant
aspect of the case is that the discovery rule applies to all tort actions
not governed by statute. As a corollary, practitioners will want to be
careful to argue within the framework of discovery rule's three-pronged
test because the court appears to be requiring a hard look at the facts
on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the newly-expanded discovery
rule does not "eviscerate" the statute of limitations.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cart v. Marcum,' 3 the plaintiff attempted to invoke the dis-
covery rule to toll the statute of limitations because he filed suit more
than two years after an alleged conversion of his timber took place.
Cart claimed that, even though he did not file suit within two years of
the alleged conversion, he did file within two years of discovering the
tort and who committed it, and therefore, the statute of limitations
should be tolled by virtue of the discovery rule.
However, the facts indicated that Cart did know his timber was
taken and had reason to know it was taken by Jefferson, a logger with
whom he had contracted for the sale of the timber. Upon discovering
that his timber was gone, Cart attempted to locate Jefferson but could
not find him. Within a year of the timber being taken, Cart did locate
two other loggers, Marcum and Hager, who had purchased at least part
of the timber from Jefferson. Cart filed suit against Jefferson, Hager,
and Marcum, but not until more than two years after the injury oc-
curred. Under these facts, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
refused to toll the statute of limitations under the discovery rule.
In the opinion, the court acknowledged that, under certain circum-
stances, the statute of limitations will be tolled until discovery of the
injury or the identity of the wrongdoer. In fact, the court took the
opportunity in Cart to expand the discovery rule to cover all torts not
already controlled by statute. However, the court restated the general
rule that the statute of limitations normally begins to run when the
injury occurs and will be tolled under the discovery rule only until the
103. 423 S.E.2d 644 (W. Va. 1992).
1994] 1217
21
Leach: Cart v. Marcum: The Discovery Rule as an Exception to the Statute
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
injured party knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should
know, of the injury and the identity of the wrongdoer.
Furthermore, the court explained that mere ignorance of the cause
of action or the identity of the wrongdoer will not toll the statute of
limitations. Thus, in order to invoke the discovery rule, a plaintiff must
make a strong showing that he was prevented from discovering the
claim or identity of the wrongdoer because of fraudulent concealment,
incomprehensible injury, or other extreme hardship. The determination
of whether the plaintiff was prevented from discovering the claim is a
factual question, and great circumspection on a case-by-case basis is
required to determine whether the discovery rule applies.
Although the court used language in both a syllabus point and the
opinion which seemed to suggest that the discovery rule now requires a
showing of some action by the defendant which prevented the plaintiff
from discovering the claim or identity of the wrongdoer, a close read-
ing of the case shows that, in fact, the court was considering only
whether defendants Marcum and Hager had done anything to prevent
Cart from discovering their identities. The court reached this question
in the case only because Cart already knew the identity of Jefferson,
the person who was responsible for removing the timber from Cart's
land. Because Cart knew Jefferson's identity, he had notice sufficient
to start the statute of limitations running. At that point, due diligence
required him to explore the full extent of the injury, namely to deter-
mine whether any other parties could be held liable in the action.
Therefore, the statute of limitations would have been tolled as to the
other parties only if they had done something to prevent Cart from
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